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I. Introduction 
	
A	significant	part	of	 the	debates	over	European	private	 law	concerns	the	relations	
between	 the	 member	 state	 level	 and	 the	 European	 level.	 The	 substance	 of	 this	
debate	has	 remained	 remarkably	 constant	 in	 since	 it	 arose	 some	 thirty	 years	ago,	
despite	the	events	that	have	taken	place	during	that	period:	the	growth	of	actual	EU	
legislation	 in	 European	 private	 law;	 the	 formulation	 of	 a	 social	 alternative	 to	 the	
perceived	market	 liberal	private	law	ideal	dominating	in	EU	law,	the	simultaneous	
broadening	 and	 deepening	 of	 European	 integration,	 etc.	 Still,	 the	 basic	 question	
remains	 this:	how	much	private	 law	should	be	made	 (and	unified)	on	a	European	
level,	how	much	law	should	remain	within	the	member	states,	and	how	should	the	
relations	between	European	and	domestic	level	be	organized?	
	
If	the	debates	deal	with	the	same	substance,	the	terminology,	however,	has	changed.	
For	a	long	time,	national	European	law	was	defended	as	an	achievement	of	national	
identity	and	democratic	legitimacy—the	cultural	value	of	national	private	law	was	a	
relevant	factor,	but	it	was	usually	defended	as	a	subset	of	national	law.1	Today,	the	
European	Union	has	significantly	improved	its	democratic	legitimacy	and	moved	its	
own	 identity	beyond	that	of	a	purely	economic	union.	 It	 is	perhaps	 in	response	 to	
these	 changes	 that	 defenders	 of	 national	 private	 law	 are	 now,	 more	 and	 more,	
invoking	a	new	 idea	–	 that	of	 legal	pluralism.2	And	 indeed,	 some	Europeanists	are	
accepting	the	terminology	and	begin	to	argue	against	such	legal	pluralism.3	
	
But	 legal	 pluralism	 is	 no	 invention	 by	 private	 lawyers—both	 the	 concept	 and	 the	
theory	 have	 spurred	 long	 discussions	 in	 legal	 anthropology,	 legal	 sociology,	 and	
legal	theory.	Although	proponents	of	a	European	legal	pluralism	sometimes	invoke	
these	discussions,	 they	 tend	 to	gloss	over	 the	precise	way	 in	which	 the	concept	 is	
defined	and	defended	in	these	debates,	and	they	tend	to	ignore	the	backlash	that	has	
emerged	against	 the	concept	 in	 these	disciplines.	This	 is	unfortunate.	After	all,	 the	
discussion	 provides	 rich	 experiences,	 both	 theoretical	 and	 empirical,	 on	 the	
interactions	between	legal	orders.	European	private	law	could	perhaps	benefit	from	
																																																								
1	See	R	Michaels,	‘Code	vs	Code:	Nationalist	and	Internationalist	Images	of	the	Code	
civil	in	the	French	Resistance	to	a	European	Codification’	(2012)	8	European	Review	
of	Contract	Law	___	.	
2	In	addition	to	the	texts	by	Legrand,	Smits	and	Wilhelmsson	discussed	below,	see	
e.g.	K	Purnhagen,	‘Principles	of	European	Private	or	Civil	Law?	–	A	Reminder	of	the	
Symbiotic	Relationship	between	the	ECJ	and	the	CFR	in	a	Pluralistic	European	
Private	Law’	European	Law	Journal	(forthcoming);		see	already	R	Schulze,	
‘Pluralismus	der	Rechte	in	Europa’	in	HD	Assmann	et	al	(eds),	Unterschiedliche	
Rechtskulturen—Konvergenz	des	Rechtsdenkens	(Nomos,	2001).	
3	Eg	B	Akkermans,	‘L’Europe,	c’est	nous’	and	the	way	forward…,’	Mastricht	European	
Private	Law	Blog	at	www.mepli.blogspot.com/2011/01/leurope‐cest‐nous‐and‐
way‐forward.html	(January	25,	2011).	
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taking	 these	 debates	 into	 account;	 at	 least	 they	 may	 help	 throw	 new	 lights	 on	
existing	debates.	
	
In	this	paper	I	want	to	take	a	first,	critical,	step	towards	such	an	account.	I	want	to	
scrutinize	 the	 concepts	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 used	 by	 three	 of	 its	 most	 prominent	
proponents:	 Pierre	 Legrand,	 Jan	 Smits,	 and	 Thomas	 Wilhelmsson.	 I	 do	 not	 offer	
fully‐fledged	 criticism	 of	 their	 theories	 (each	 of	 which	 are	 among	 the	 most	
fascinating	and	helpful	 in	the	European	private	 law	debate)	but	only	address	their	
use	 of	 ideas	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 and	 the	 relation	 of	 these	 ideas	 with	 the	 legal	
pluralism	debate.	My	analysis	shows	not	only	that	these	three	use	sharply	different	
concepts	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 but	 also,	 that	 none	 of	 these	 three	 concepts	 is	 in	
accordance	 with	 traditional	 definitions	 of	 pluralism.	 Further,	 it	 turns	 out	 that	
several	 points	 of	 criticism	 can	be	 raised	 against	 their	 theories	 that	 stem	 from	 the	
legal	pluralism	debate.		I	do	not,	here,	take	the	second	step	of	determining	whether	
an	 actual	 concept	 of	 European	 private	 law	 pluralism	 can	 be	 established	 –	 and	
whether	such	a	concept	can	withstand	the	criticism	that	has	been	voiced	against	the	
idea	of	legal	pluralism.	
II. Legal Pluralism and Private Law 
	
The	 traditional	 concept	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 developed	 in	 legal	 anthropology	 and	
sociology	to	analyze	overlapping	normative	orders	within	societies,	became	popular	
in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	 though	 the	 phenomenon	 is	 much	 older.4	Although	
definitions	of	legal	pluralism	diverge	on	details,5	there	is	a	wide	consensus	that	legal	
pluralism	describes	a	situation	in	which	two	or	more	laws	(or	legal	systems)	coexist	
in	(or	are	obeyed	by)	one	social	field	(or	a	population	or	an	individual).6	In	this	way,	
legal	pluralism	is	opposed	to	what	is	called	state	centralism—a	perceived	monopoly	
of	the	state	in	making	and	administering	law.	The	contribution	of	this	concept	to	our	
understanding	of	law	is,	therefore,	twofold:	First,	it	suggests	that	normative	orders	
not	generated	by	the	state	can	also	be	viewed	as	 law.	Second,	as	a	consequence,	 it	
requires	us	to	deal	with	the	existence	of,	and	interaction	among,	more	than	one	legal	
order.	
	
																																																								
4	B	Tamanaha,	‘Understanding	Legal	Pluralism:	Past	to	Present,	Local	to	Global’	
(2008)	30	Sydney	Law	Review	375;	L	Benton,	‘Historical	Perspectives	on	Legal	
Pluralism’	(2011)	3	Hague	Journal	on	the	Rule	of	Law	57.	
5	For	discussion,	see	F	von	Benda‐Beckmann,	‘Who’s	Afraid	of	Legal	Pluralism?’		
(2002)	47	Journal	of	Legal	Pluralism	and	Unofficial	Law	37;	W	Twining,	‘Normative	
and	Legal	Pluralism:	A	Global	Perspective’	(2010)	20	Duke	Journal	of	International	
and	Comparative	Law	473.	
6	R	Michaels,	‘Global	Legal	Pluralism’	(2009)	5	Annual	Review	of	Law	and	the	Social	
Sciences	243,	245.	
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In	theory,	the	first	aspect	–	non‐state	law	–	should	be	of	specific	interest	to	private	
lawyers.	After	all	 ‘private’	 law	has	always	been	about	both:	 law	made	 for	 and	 law	
made	by	private	parties.7	However,	although	some	participants	in	the	debates	about	
European	private	law	do	include	the	first	aspect	and	address	the	existence	and	role	
of	 non‐state	 law	 in	 European	 private	 law,8	the	 focus	 on	 the	 debate	 on	 European	
private	 law	pluralism	is	on	the	second	aspect,	 that	of	plurality.	This	might	suggest	
that	what	authors	mean	when	they	say	pluralism	is	merely	plurality,	and	therefore,	
debates	 on	 legal	 pluralism	 would	 not	 be	 helpful.	 I	 do	 not	 think	 this	 response	 is	
successful.	 If	 indeed	 the	 European	 discourse	 addresses	merely	 the	 existence	 of	 a	
plurality	 of	 legal	 orders,	 without	 attention	 to	 their	 interaction,	 that	 discourse	 is	
incomplete	and	can	benefit	from	the	legal	pluralism	debate.	
	
a)  ‘Weak’ or Juridical Legal Pluralism 
The	 first	 generation	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 at	 least	 in	 this	 trajectory,	 was	 developed,	
especially	 by	 lawyers,	 in	 the	 colonial	 and	 postcolonial	 context.9	Colonies	 in	 Africa	
and	 Asia	 lacked	 the	 order	 of	 law	 in	 European	 states;	 they	 displayed	 somewhat	
unorganized	 laws	 that	 were	 deemed	 tribal,	 or	 customary	 law.	 Colonizing	 powers	
imposed	their	own	 law,	while	carefully	 leaving	some	space	 for	 this	customary	 law	
that	 they	 found.	 Legal	 pluralism	was	 then	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 describe	 the	 ensuing	
plurality	of	interacting	legal	systems,	and	as	a	theory	of	their	interaction.	This	type	
of	legal	pluralism	is	sometimes	called	‘juridical	pluralism’	because	it	was	described	
mainly	by	lawyers,	and	it	was	also	managed	by	specifically	 legal	means	–	direct	or	
indirect	rule,10	hierarchical	superiority	rules,	conflict‐of‐laws	rules.11	
	
																																																								
7	R	Michaels	and	N	Jansen,	‘Private	Law	Beyond	the	State?	Globalization,	
Europeanization,	Privatization’	(2006)	54	American	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	843.	
Cf.	F	Möslein,	Dispositives	Recht	(Mohr	Siebeck,	2011).		
8	See	e.g.	J	Smits,	Private	Law	2.0:	on	the	Role	of	Private	Actors	in	a	Post‐National	
Society	(Hague	Institute	for	the	Internationalisation	of	Law,	2011)	8‐9;	;	Christian	
Joerges,	‘A	New	Type	of	Conflicts	Law	as	Constitutional	Form	in	the	Postnational	
Constellation’	(2011)	Transnational	Legal	Theory	153,	160.	The	most	magisterial	
analysis	(though	not	exclusively	focused	on	Europe)	is	G	Calliess	and	P	Zumbansen,	
Rough	Consensus	and	Running	Code:	A	Theory	of	Transnational	Private	Law	(Hart,	
2010).	
9	MB	Hooker,	Legal	Pluralism	(Oxford:	Clarendon,	1975).	
10	M	Crowder,	‘Indirect	Rule:	French	and	British	Style’		(1964)	34	Journal	of	the	
International	African	Institute	197.	
11	RD	Kollewijn,	‘Conflicts	of	Western	and	Non‐Western	Law’	(1951)	4	International	
and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	307;	K	Lipstein,	‘Interpersonal	conflict	of	laws’	in	
International	Encyclopedia	of	Comparative	Law	(Mohr	Siebeck/MartinusNijhoff	
1985);	U	Uche,	‘Conflict	of	Laws	in	a	Multi‐Ethnic	Setting:	Lessons	From	Anglophone	
Africa’	(1991)	228	Recueil	des	Cours	273.	
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This	 concept	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 came	 under	 severe	 criticism.12	The	main	 criticism	
was	 that	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 state	 is	 still	 viewed	 as	 superior	 to	 other	 legal	
orders	was	no	way	to	overcome	state	centralism.13	In	some	ways,	it	creates	even	an	
enhanced	 state	 centralism,	 because	 now	 state	 law	 sets	 out	 to	 define,	 and	
subordinate,	even	non‐state	normative	orders.14	It	was,	in	other	words,	‘weak’	legal	
pluralism.	Moreover,	to	subject	non‐state	legal	orders	to	the	recognition	by	the	state	
was	 considered	 oppressive:	 recognition	 should	 be	 a	 consequence	of	 these	 orders’	
existence	 and	 their	 legal	 character,	 not	 its	 prerequisite.15	The	 exclusively	 legal	
perspective	on	legal	pluralism	was	blamed	for	this	situation;	the	exclusive	focus	on	
order	was	considered	repressive.	
	
b) ‘Strong’ or Sociological Legal Pluralism 
An	 alternative	 to	 this	 ‘weak’	 or	 juridical	 legal	 pluralism	was	 sought	 and	 found	 in	
what	 is	 sometimes	 called	 ‘strong’	 or	 sociological	 legal	 pluralism.	 This	 view	 takes	
legal	 pluralism	 as	 a	 fact	 of	 sociological	 observation,	 which	 demonstrates	 that	
individuals	 everywhere	 are	 governed	 by	 (or	 feel	 compelled	 by)	 a	 plurality	 of	
different,	sometimes	conflicting	norms,	only	some	of	which	emanate	 in	 the	state.16	
The	sociological	perspective	also	rejects	clear	rules	describing	the	relation	between	
the	existing	plural	orders.	Hierarchy	is	rejected,	both	on	normative	and	on	empirical	
grounds:	hierarchy	is	not	desirable	to	give	hierarchy	to	state	law	and	thereby	reduce	
other	laws	to	the	status	of	subordination,	but	hierarchy	is	also	not	empirically	true,	
because	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 different	 normative	 orders	 is	 under	 constant	
negotiation.	Conflict	of	laws	rules	are	also	dismissed	(in	my	view,	a	bit	too	hastily)17,	
either	 because	 such	 rules	 deny	 legal	 pluralism	 altogether	 (by	 allocating	 a	 distinct	
space	to	each	of	them)	or	because	they	provide	an	unduly	technical	and	orderly	way	
to	deal	with	the	interactions	between	legal	orders.	Instead,	the	idea	of	‘interlegality,’	
introduced	by	Boaventura	de	Sousa	Santos,	has	proven	popular.	
	
This	 ‘new’	 legal	 pluralism	 was	 not	 necessarily	 confined	 to	 the	 colonial	 and	
postcolonial	 context	 and	 has	 been	 made	 fruitful	 also	 for	 interactions	 between	
official	and	unofficial	rules	in	Western	legal	systems.		
																																																								
12	See	especially,	John	Griffiths,	‘What	is	Legal	Pluralism’	(1986)	24	Journal	of	Legal	
Pluralism	and	Unofficial	Law	1.	
13	Griffiths,	supra	note	12	at	8.	
14	See	also	R	Michaels,	‘The	Re‐State‐Ment	of	Non‐State	Law’	(2005)	51	Wayne	Law	
Review	1209.	
15	See	also	R	Bolens	et	al,	Legal	Pluralism	and	the	Politics	of	Inclusion:	Recognition	
and	Contestation	of	Local	Water	Rights	in	the	Andes,	in	B	van	Koppen	et	al	(eds)	
Community‐based	Water	Law	and	Water	Resource	Management	Reform	in	Developing	
Countries		(CAB	International,	2007)	96,	99‐101.	
16	Griffiths,	supra	note	12	at	4	(‘Legal	pluralism	is	a	fact.	Legal	centralism	is	a	myth,	
an	ideal,	a	claim,	an	illusion.’).	
17	R	Michaels,		supra	note	6,	at	245	with	references.	See	also	now	PS	Berman,	Global	
Legal	Pluralism	(Cambridge	University	Press	2012).	
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c) Critique of Legal Pluralism 
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 idea	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 whether	 weak	 or	 strong,	 juristic	 or	
sociological,	has	come	under	severe	criticism	in	legal	sociology	and	anthropology.18	
Notably	(and	importantly)	the	alternative	proposed	by	the	critics	has	not	been	legal	
monism.	 Their	 point	 was	 not	 to	 deny	 the	 plurality	 of	 law,	 but	 rather	 the	 way	 in	
which	this	plurality	is	conceptualized	by	proponents	of	legal	pluralism.	
	
Among	the	myriad	of	critical	points,	 the	 following	may	be	the	most	helpful	 for	the	
debate	on	legal	pluralism	in	Europe.	First,	ideas	of	legal	pluralism,	willingly	or	not,	
tend	 to	 prioritize,	 normatively,	 plurality	 over	 uniformity,	 without	 a	 clear	
justification.19	In	 the	 same	 realm,	 they	 prefer	 the	 local	 over	 the	 global,	 or,	 put	
differently,	they	tend	to	romanticize	customary,	non‐state	legal	orders,	while	at	the	
same	time	villifying	the	state.	Second,	studies	of	 legal	pluralism	are	often	blind	for	
power	 relations,	 both	 within	 and	 between	 legal	 orders:	20	The	 emphasis	 on	 a	
plurality	 of	 legal	 orders	 underestimates	 the	 tendency	 of	 some	 of	 those	 to	 be	 far	
more	 powerful	 than	 others;	 the	 view	 of	 customary	 legal	 orders	 as	 ‘black	 boxes’	
makes	criticism	of	 the	content	of	customary	 law	difficult	 to	sustain.	 (This	struggle	
plays	 out	 also	 in	 the	 debate	 between	 multiculturalism	 and	 basic	 rights,	 and	 the	
question	 whether	 the	 autonomy	 of	 groups	 should	 be	 recognized	 even	 if	 these	
groups	 themselves	 discriminate	 internally	 against	 their	 members.)	 Third,	 legal	
pluralism	 tends	 to	 essentialize	 legal	 orders—it	 assigns	 objective	 reality	 to	 them,	
whereas	 in	 reality	 such	 orders	 remain	 in	 constant	 flux,	 may	 change	 over	 time,	
develop	 both	 internally	 and	 in	 their	 relationship	with	 other	 orders.21	Fourth,	 and	
relatedly,	the	idea	of	legal	pluralism	requires	the	possibility	to	distinguish	between	
legal	 relations	 within	 a	 legal	 order	 and	 relations	 between	 legal	 orders;	 it	 must	
therefore	assume	relatively	strong	boundaries	between	legal	orders,	and	a	relatively	
high	 degree	 of	 consistency	 within	 legal	 orders.22	Fifth,	 legal	 pluralism,	 in	 its	
emphasis	on	legal	orders	as	constraints,	underestimates	human	agency.23	
	
	
																																																								
18	For	debate	of	much	of	this	criticism	by	a	proponent	of	legal	pluralism	see	Benda‐
Beckmann,	supra	note	5.	For	references	for	the	following	critique,	see	Michaels,	
supra	note	6.	
19	M	Sharafi,	‘Justice	in	Many	Rooms	Since	Galanter:	De‐Romanticizing	Legal	
Pluralism	Through	the	Cultural	Defense’	(2008)71	Law	&	Contemporart	Problems	
139.	
20	G	Barzilai,	‘Beyond	Relativism:	Where	is	Political	Power	in	Legal	Pluralism?’	(2008)	9	
Theoretical	Inquiries	in	Law	395.	
21	JF	Weiner, ‘Eliciting customary law’ (2006) Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 15.	
22	S	Wastell,	‘Presuming	Scale,	Making	Diversity	–	On	the	Mischiefs	of	Measurement	and	the	
Global:	Local	Metonym	in	Theories	of	Law	and	Culture’	(2001)	21	Critique	of	Anthropology	
185.	
23	Jeremy	Webber,	‘Legal	Pluralism	and	Human	Agency’	(2006)	44	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal	
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III. A Communitarian Pluralism – Pierre Legrand 
My	 first	 example	 comes	 from	 Pierre	 Legrand,	 who	 has	 long	 advocated	 that	 the	
plurality	of	European	legal	systems	is	both	desirable	and	insurmountable.		Legrand	
is	responsible	for	a	university	program	on	‘globalization	and	legal	pluralism’	at	the	
Sorbonne,	 and	 frequently	 invokes	 ideas	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 for	 his	 opposition	 to	
convergence	and	unification	of	European	private	law.24	Here	is	an	excerpt	from	his	
criticism	of	the	Draft	Common	Frame	of	Reference	project:25	
I need not even argue that legal pluralism is inherently good. It is enough for me to say 
that legal traditions and the diversity of forms of life-in-the-law they embody remain the 
expression of the human capacity for choice and self-creation and, as such, deserve to be 
respected as incorporating a vital aspect of social existence which helps to define 
selfhood. Legal communities and individuals within these communities deserve to be 
given their historical due. They are entitled to deep-level recognition. Indeed, they can 
demand recognition of their ontological identity but also of their positional identity; I 
have in mind, for instance, the common law’s antirrhetic positioning vis-à̀-vis the civil 
law. 
 
This	is,	clearly,	a	sociological	(or	cultural),	not	a	juridical	pluralism.	And	indeed,	this	
brief	 passage	 sounds	 attractive	 enough.	 Yet,	 closer	 analysis	 reveals	 a	 number	 of	
problems	and	inconsistencies.		
	
a) Pluralism and Choice 
First,	 Legrand	 suggests	 that	 legal	 traditions	 must	 be	 recognized	 because	 they	
express	 ‘the	human	capacity	 for	 choice	and	self‐creation;’	 they	 incorporate	 ‘a	vital	
aspect	 of	 social	 existence	which	 helps	 to	 define	 selfhood.’	 Legal	 traditions	 are,	 in	
other	 words,	 both	 the	 object	 of	 choice	 and	 its	 precondition.	 We,	 as	 individuals,	
should	be	free	to	choose	our	own	legal	tradition	–	say,	that	of	English	law—and	not	
have	 some	 foreign	 tradition	 imposed	 on	 us—say,	 that	 of	 the	 civil	 law,	 or	 of	 a	
European	civil	code.	And,	at	the	same	time,	if	we	are	denied	our	legal	tradition,	we	
are	 denied	 our	 own	 social	 existence	 and	 thereby	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 for	
meaningful	choice.	
Legal	traditions	are	thus	object	and	precondition	of	choice	at	the	same	time.	This	is	
not	 paradoxical,	 but	 it	makes	 the	 role	 of	 choice	 certainly	more	 complex	 than	 this	
seemingly	 simple	 quote	 suggests.	 Thus,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 Legrand	 does	 not	 here	
advocate	 the	 free	 choice	of	 any	 legal	 tradition,	 that	 is,	 the	 idea	of	 a	 law	market,26	
																																																								
24	See	already	P	Legrand,	‘Against	a	European	Civil	Code’	(1997)	60	Modern	Law	
Review	44,	53	(‘The	promotion	of	a	European	Civil	Code	effectively	represents	an	
attack	on	pluralism’).	
25	P	Legrand,	‘Antivonbar’	(2005)	1	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	13,	36,	internal	
footnote	omitted.	
26	EA	O’Hara	and	LE	Ribstein,	The	Law	Market	(Oxford	University	Press,	2009).	
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where	 law	 becomes	 a	mere	 product.27	He	 would	 view	 a	 law	market	 as	 an	 undue	
imposition	 of	 the	 logic	 of	 economics,	 competition,	 and	 commensuration,	 on	 legal	
traditions.28	In	 his	 proposal,	 we	 are	 in	 fact	 allowed	 only	 to	 choose	 our	 own	 legal	
tradition.	 Indeed,	 Legrand	 has	 elsewhere	 suggested	 that	we	 are	 so	 bound	 by	 our	
tradition	that	we	cannot	overcome	it:	a	civil	lawyer	can	never	think	like	a	common	
lawyers;	he	can	never	become	anything	else	than	what	he	is.29	This	type	of	selfhood	
then,	it	seems,	is	the	opposite	of	choice;	it	is	a	matter	of	fate.	If	this	implies	freedom,	
then	it	is	at	best	the	Hegelian	idea	of	freedom	as	the	insight	into	necessity.30		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Legrand	 is	 certainly	 correct	 that	we	make	 our	 choice	 not	 in	 a	
vacuum	 but	 within	 the	 constraints	 and	 empowerments	 from	 our	 environment,	
including	 our	 culture	 and	 our	 legal	 tradition.	 True	 choice	 and	 true	 definition	 of	
selfhood	 are	 not	 possible	 without	 recognition	 of	 that	 environment,	 and	 that	
environment	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 for	 our	 choices.	 Legrand	 sides	 here	 with	
communitarian/post‐Hegelian	critics	of	liberalism,	who	point	out	that	the	self	is	not	
prior	to	its	decisions.31	
This	preference	for	communitarianism	is	a	possible	position,	although	maybe	not	a	
watertight	 one.	 Amartya	 Sen,	 for	 example,	 has,	 without	 addressing	 Legrand	 or	
comparative	 law,	 suggested	 that	 our	 identities	 are	 a	 matter	 of	 our	 choice,	 not	
necessity.32	Moreover,	Sen’s	 idea	of	 ‘substantial’	 freedom	 is	almost	 the	opposite	of	
Legrand’s	 Hegelian	 insight	 into	 necessity:	 it	 is	 the	 maximization	 of	 real	
opportunities,	which	may	have	to	be	brought	about	by	a	change	of	the	governance	
structure.	
	
Legrand’s	views	on	the	relation	between	choice	and	environment	may	be	defensible.	
What	 seems	 odd,	 however,	 is	 his	 implicit	 assumption	 that	 that	 environment	 is	
necessarily,	and	unchangeably,	given	by	a	national	legal	tradition.	This	assumption	
is	 not	 implied	 by	 his	 communitarian	 allies—whereas	 Hegel,	 of	 course,	 indeed	
viewed	the	state	as	the	highest	order,	communitarians	in	his	succession	like	Taylor	
and	Walzer	have	emphasized	the	importance	of	non‐state	communities	and	orders,	
and	 in	 fact	 their	 multiplicity.	 Arguably,	 our	 legal	 environment	 today,	 and	 the	
																																																								
27	Roberta	Romano,	‘Law	as	a	Product:	Some	Pieces	of	the	Incorporation	Puzzle’	
(1985)	1	Journal	of	Law,	Economics,	and	Organization	225;	H	Eidenmüller,	‘The	
Transnational	Law	Market,	Regulatory	Competition,	and	Transnational	
Corporations’	(2011)	18	Indiana	Journal	of	Global	Legal	Studies	707.	
28	P	Legrand,	‘Econocentrism’	(2009)	59	University	of	Toronto	Law	Journal	215.	
29	P	Legrand,	‘European	Legal	Systems	are	not	Converging’	(1996)	45	International	
&	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	52,	78.	
30	On	the	connection	between	Legrand’s	ideas	and	Hegel,	see	J	Q	Whitman,	‘The	Neo‐
Romantic	Turn’	in	P	Legrand	&	R	Munday	(eds)	Comparative	Legal	Studies:	
Traditions	and	Transitions	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2003)	at	316.	
31	See	e.g.,	M	Sandel,	Liberalism	and	the	Limits	of	Justice	(Harvard	University	Press,	
2d	ed.	1998);	Charles	Taylor,	Sources	of	the	Self:	The	Making	of	Modern	Identity	
(Harvard	University	Press,	1989);	M	Walzer,	Spheres	of	Justice:	A	Defense	of	Plurality	
and	Equality	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	1983).	
32	A	Sen,	Reason	Before	Identity	(Oxford	University	Press,	1999).	
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conditions	of	 our	 choices,	 are	 also	 already	made	up	of	 a	 cacophony	of	 norms	and	
laws,	some	of	which	are	from	foreign	legal	traditions	or	from	supranational	law	or	
from	nonstate	normative	orders	like	religion.	Legrand’s	view,	that	we	are	influenced	
only	by	one	legal	tradition,	be	it	civil	of	common	law,	actually	appears	to	suppress	
such	difference.	This	is	no	novelty:	 legal	pluralism	in	this	sense	characterized	both	
the	common	law	and	the	civil	law	since	times	immemorial.33	But	although	Legrand	
acknowledges	 the	existence	of	differences	within	 legal	 traditions,	he	 clearly	views	
them	as	secondary,34	and	they	play	no	role	for	his	analysis.35	
	
b) Just and Unjust Communities 
Let	 me	 move	 to	 another	 point.	 Legrand	 suggests	 that	 ‘legal	 communities	 and	
individuals	within	these	communities	deserve	to	be	given	their	historical	due.’	We	
may	wonder	what	‘their	historical	due’	is	exactly,	but	it	seems	to	be	something.	But	
in	what	sense	is	this	not	an	is/ought	cross‐over?	Why	does	a	legal	tradition	deserve	
recognition	merely	because	it	exists?	
This	 is	 a	 problem	 that	 permeates	discussions	 in	 legal	 pluralism,	 too:	 cultures	 and	
traditions	 are	 viewed	 as	 deserving	 protection	 merely	 because	 they	 exist.	 This	
sounds	 attractive,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 obvious.	 The	 mafia	 culture	 is	 cruel;	 is	 it	
nonetheless	 worthy	 of	 protection	 merely	 because	 it	 is	 a	 culture?	 It	 may	 be	
paternalistic	to	try	and	eradicate	cultures	merely	for	the	sake	of	unity,	but	is	it	not	
similarly	paternalistic	to	want	to	protect	and	defend	cultures	and	traditions	merely	
for	the	sake	of	their	existence?	
The	biggest	problem,	however,	 lies	 elsewhere:	 It	 is	 fine	 to	 recognize	 communities	
and	individuals,	but	what	 if	 there	 is	a	conflict	between	what	 legal	communities	are	
due	and	what	individuals	within	these	communities	are	due?	This	is	the	issue	brought	
to	 the	 fore	 in	 Susan	 Moller	 Okin’s	 now	 famous	 powerful	 question	 whether	
multiculturalism	 is	bad	 for	women,	because	 the	cultural	groups	 that	we	recognize	
may	 themselves	 be	 discriminatory.36	In	 such	 a	 case,	 arguably,	 we	 can	 either	
recognize	fully	the	community	or	the	individual	but	not	both,	and	it	 is	not	obvious	
																																																								
33	For	the	common	law,	see	HW	Arthurs,	Without	the	Law:	Administrative	Justice	and	
Legal	Pluralism	in	Nineteenth	Century	England	(University	of	Toronto	Press,	1985);	L	
Sheleff,		The	Future	of	Tradition:	Customary	Law,	Common	Law,	and	Legal	Pluralism	
(2000);	GR	Woodman,	‘The	involvement	of	English	common	law	with	other	laws’	in	
C	Eberhard	and	G	Vernicos	(eds)	La	quête	anthropologique	du	droit:	Autour	de	la	
démarche	d’Etienne	Le	Roy	(Editions	Karthala,	2006),	477.		For	the	civil	law,	see	B	
Tamanaha,	supra	note	4,	at	377‐81;	J	Tontti	,	European	Legal	Pluralism	as	a	Rebirth	
of	Jus	Commune,	(2001)	24	Retfaerd	Nord	40.	
34	E.g.	Legrand,	supra	note	29,	at	63	
35	Cf.	Geoffrey	Samuel,	Epistemology	and	Method	in	Law	(Ashgate	2003)	50	note	141.	
36	S	Moller	Okin,	Is	Multiculturalism	Bad	for	Women?	(Princeton	University	Press	
1999).	
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which	of	 them	should	 take	priority.37	The	mere	 idea	of	 (‘deep’)	 recognition,	which	
Legrand	 borrows	 from	 Michael	 Walzer,	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 help;	 it	 is	 precisely	 in	
response	 to	 the	 emphasis	 on	 recognition	 (by	 Walzer	 and	 others)	 that	 Okin’s	
challenge	and	the	ensuing	debate	arose.	
These	questions	 are,	 at	 least	 prima	 facie,	 relevant	 also	 to	private	 law.	Private	 law	
has	traditionally	been	viewed	as	freedom‐enhancing,	but	there	is	little	doubt	that	it	
can	 also	 be	 constraining.38	Same‐sex	 couples	who	 cannot	 get	married	 under	 Irish	
law	are	 an	obvious	 example.	 consumers	who	are	barred	 from	purchasing	 	 certain	
products	 are	 another,	 but	 of	 course,	 so	 are	 consumers	 who	 are	 stuck,	 under	
doctrines	 of	 freedom	 of	 contract,	 with	 destructive	 mortgage	 contracts.	 The	
communitarian	argument	may	still	succeed	if	 it	can	be	shown	that	the	best	way	to	
improve	the	individual’s	situation	lies	within	the	respective	legal	system—in	other	
words,	although	private	 law	systems	may	be	different,	and	differently	unjust,	 they	
each	 provide	 the	 best	 opportunities	 for	 improvement	 internally.	 This	 would	 be	
plausible	 if	 indeed	 freedom	 and	 embeddedness	 within	 one’s	 legal	 tradition	 were	
inseparably	 linked—the	 argument	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 Many	
individuals,	however,	seem	to	disagree—they	opt	out	of	their	own	legal	systems.	
Christian	Joerges	has	made	a	powerful	counterproposal	to	Legrand’s	suggestion	that	
recognition	of	the	individual	and	her	legal	order	are	the	same.	In	his	view,	one	of	the	
most	important	functions	of	European	law	is	that	it	enables	the	individual	to	require	
her	 own	 government	 to	 justify	 its	 actions.39	Here,	 the	 alternative	 is	 not	 between	
recognizing	 the	 legal	 order	 and	 recognizing	 the	 individual.	 Rather,	 the	 idea	 is	 for	
European	 law	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 her	 society	
and	empower	her,	 to	some	extent	and	under	certain	conditions,	vis‐à‐vis	 the	 legal	
order.	 Legrand	 would	 probably	 reject	 such	 types	 of	 intervention	 because	 of	 the	
violence	 they	commit	against	a	 legal	 culture	 that	deserves	protection,	but	he	does	
not	 tell	us	why	 injustice	against	a	 legal	order	must	necessarily	be	more	 important	
than	injustice	against	an	indivudal.	
	
c) ‘Antirrhesis’ 
Finally,	it	is	worth	analyzing	‘the	common	law’s	antirrhetic	positioning	vis‐à‐vis	the	
civil	 law.’40	Legrand	 borrows	 the	 idea	 of	 antirrhesis	 from	 Peter	 Goodrich,	 who	 in	
turn	 finds	 it	 in	 theological	 rhetoric.	Antirrhesis	 is,	 according	 to	Henry	Peacham,	 ‘a	
																																																								
37	This	is	a	simplified	discussion;	for	detail,	see	K	Knop,	Ralf	Michaels	&	Annelise	
Riles,	‘From	Multiculturalism	to	Technique:	Feminism,	Culture	and	the	Conflict	of	
Laws	Style’	(2012)	64	Stanford	Law	Review	589,	596‐609.	
38	The	classical	argument	is	RL	Hale,	‘Coercion	and	Distribution	in	a	Supposedly	
Non‐Coercive	State’	(1923)	38	Political	Science	Quarterly	470,.		
39	C	Joerges,	‘On	the	Legitimacy	of	Europeanising	Private	Law:	Considerations	on	a	
Justice‐making	Law	for	the	EU	Multilevel	System”’	(2003)	7:3	Electronic	Journal	of	
Comparative	Law	7:3,	http://www.ejcl.org/73/art73‐3.html;	
40	Legrand	has	made	this	argument	earlier;	see	P	Legrand,	‘The	same	and	the	
different’	in	P	Legrand	and	R	Munday	(eds),	Comparative	Legal	Studies:	Traditions	
and	Transitions	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	240,	at	244‐5.	
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form	of	speech	by	which	the	orator	rejecteth	the	authority,	opinion	or	sentence	of	
some	 person:	 for	 error	 or	wickedness	 of	 it	…	 this	 form	 of	 speech	 doth	 especially	
belong	to	confutation	and	is	most	apt	to	repell	errors	and	heresies	and	to	reject	evil	
counsell	and	lewd	perversions.41	What	is	at	stake	here,	is,	in	other	words,	the	violent	
refutation	of	an	argument.	As	such	it	appears	to	be,	if	anything,	the	very	opposite	of	
the	recognition	that	Legrand	proclaims.	
It	 seems	 questionable	 whether	 such	 antirrhesis	 really	 describes,	 in	 an	 objective	
sense,	the	view	the	common	law	takes	of	the	civil	law.	Goodrich	himself	does	argue	
this,	but	mainly	in	the	context	of	debates	in	sixteenth	century	England:	 ‘the	rule	of	
the	 parent	 civil	 law	 is	 a	 trauma	 for	 a	 common	 law	 which	 seeks	 its	 own	 identity	
through	separation,	antirrhetic,	and	polemic.’42	This	describes	a	particular	point	 in	
time—the	fight	of	protestants	against	catholics	(who	represented	the	civil	law).	It	is	
not	obvious	why	this	historical	precedent	of	antirrhesis	must	invariably	still	be	valid	
today—or	why	 this	 particular	 view	 of	 the	 rhetorical	 element	 in	 the	 common	 law,	
found	in	the	common	law,	should	be	unavoidable	for	modern	(or	postmodern)	legal	
anslysis.43	
For	 comparative	 law	 purposes,	 another	 thing	 is	 even	more	 important.	We	 should	
recall	that	the	violent	refutation	in	question	here	was	not	directed	against	the	civil	
law	as	the	external	other,	but	first	and	foremost	against	the	heretics	within	English	
law.44	The	problem	was	not,	in	other	words,	that	the	civil	law	was	irremediable	alien	
to	the	common	law	but,	rather,	that	it	was	threatening	to	take	over	English	law	from	
within.	Or,	put	differently,	the	fight	between	common	law	and	civil	 law	was	a	fight	
within	an	English	law	that	was	itself	pluralistic	 in	nature.	 	Legrand’s	own	frequent	
point	 that	 the	 common	 law	 is	 incommensurable	 with	 the	 civil	 law	 is	 itself	 a	
rhetorical	move,	a	claim	not	for	empirical	truth	but	a	position.	
	
Whether,	 then,	 the	 common	 law	 is	 really	 antirrhetic	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 civil	 law,	 is	 a	
matter	of	 viewpoint,	 perhaps	also	of	 empirics.	What	 seems	 clear,	 however,	 is	 that	
antirrhesis	is	a	consequence	not	of	incommensurability	but,	quite	to	the	contrary,	is	
one	(extreme)	position	taken	in	response	to	the	threat	of	actual	commensurability.		
This	means	that	this	is	only	one	possible	position	that	legal	traditions	can	take	vis‐à‐
vis	each	other,	and	it	is	not	even	the	one	that	Legrand	himself	seems	to	prefer.	The	
normative	problem	is	that	antirrhesis	represents	precisely	the	violence	against	the	
other	that	Legrand	otherwise	deplores.	
	
The	trouble	with	Legrand’s	theory,	then,	is	twofold.	On	the	one	hand,	he	commits	to	
a	 number	 of	 ideas	 that	 are	 in	 accordance	with	 legal	 pluralism	but	 that	 have	been	
																																																								
41	H	Peacham,	The	Garden	of	Eloquence	(H.	Jackson,	1593),	sig.	N	iv	b‐N	v	a;	cited	
after	P	Goodrich,	‘Antirrhesis.	Polemical	Structures	of	Common	Law	Thought’	in	A	
Sarat	and	TR	Kearns	(eds),	The	Rhetoric	of	Law	(1995)	5,	59.	
42	P	Goodrich,	Oedipus	Lex:	Psychoanalysis,	History,	Law	(University	of	California	
Press,	1995)	160.	
43	Cf	R	Weisberg,	‘Response	to	Goodrich	on	the	Antirrhetic’	(1992)	4	Cardozo	Studies	
in	Law	and	Literature	237,	238.	
44	Cf	Goodrich	207.	
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shown	to	be	problematic.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	questionable	whether	his	theory	is	
one	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 at	 all.	 If	 legal	 pluralism	 depicts	 ‘the	 coexistence	 of	 several	
normative	 orders	 in	 the	 same	 social	 field’	 then	 Legrand’s	 depiction	 is	 not	 legal	
pluralism,	because	he	denies,	or	at	least	downplays,	the	existence	of	the	very	social	
field	in	question:	for	him,	legal	traditions	exist	in	neatly	distinct	fields.	This	is	quite	a	
powerful	 limitation	 of	 his	 theory,	 because	 it	 is	 the	 very	 interpenetration	 of	 legal	
orders	 that	 creates	 the	 question.	Moreover,	 although	 he	 sometimes	 denies	 this,	45	
one	 underlying	 assumption	 seems	 to	 be	 of	 legal	 cultures	 that	 are	 conceived	 of	 as	
unrealistically	unchangeable.	
	
	
	
IV.A Liberal Pluralism– Jan Smits 
	
Such	 criticism	 may	 not	 be	 apt	 against	 Jan	 Smits’s	 recent	 development	 of	 legal	
pluralism	 as	 a	 helpful	 approach	 for	 European	 private	 law.46	The	 plurality	 of	 laws	
that	Smits	has	in	mind	is	not	just,	as	in	some	of	his	earlier	work,	that	of	the	member	
state	laws.	Rather,	Smits	argues	that	the	nation	state	can	no	longer	be	viewed	as	the	
exclusive	source	of	private	law,	nor	can	its	democratic	procedures	be	viewed	as	the	
sole	 source	 of	 legitimacy	 for	 private	 law	 norms.47	A	 plurality	 of	 sources	 exists—
some	national,	 some	European,	some	non‐state—and	the	multiple	sources	overlap	
(have,	as	he	puts	it,	‘an	equal	claim	to	validity’48)	and	stand	in	no	clear	hierarchical	
relation	 that	 could	establish	priorities.	As	a	 consequence,	 it	becomes	questionable	
whether	 private	 law	 is	 still	 ‘a	 system.’	 Smits	 argues	 that	 such	 pluralism	 should	
neither	be	eliminated—through	uniformisation	or	 through	 top‐down	allocation	by	
means	 of	 private‐international‐law	 rules—nor	 managed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 some	
overarching	policy,	as	in	the	Open	Method	of	Coordination.	Rather,	plurality	should	
be	 encouraged.	 Borrowing	 from	 literature	 on	 legal	 pluralism,	 Smits	 argues	 that	
people	can	feel	a	sense	of	belonging	to	several	groups	and	being	bound	to	their	rules,	
																																																								
45	Legrand	himself	distances	himself	from	claims	for	internal	coherence	of	either	the	
civil	or	the	common	law	tradition:	P	Legrand,	supra	note	40	at	244.	His	argument,	
however,	seems	to	rest	on	such	an	assumption.	
46	J	Smits,	‘Plurality	of	Sources	in	European	Private	Law,	or:	How	to	Live	With	Legal	
Diversity?,’	in	Brownsword	et	al.	(eds),	The	Foundations	of	European	Private	Law	
(Hart	Publishing	2011)	323;	J	Smits,	‘	A	Radical	View	of	Legal	Pluralism’	in	this	
volume	____.	
47	On	this	point	also	J	Smits,	‘European	Private	Law	and	Democracy—A	
Misunderstood	Relationship’	in	M.	Faure	and	F	Stephen	(eds),	Essays	in	the	Law	and	
Economics	of	Regulation	in	Honour	of	Anthony	Ogus	(Oxford	Intersentia,	2008)	49.	
48	J	Smits,	‘The	Complexity	of	Transnational	Law:	Coherence	and	Fragmentation	of	
Private	Law’	(2010)	14:3	Electronic	Journal	of	Comparative	Law,	10,	
http://www.ejcl.org/143/abs143‐14.html.	.	
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so	 they	 should	 be	 able	 to	 choose	 the	 laws	 applicable	 to	 them.	 The	 consequence	
would	be	the	decline	of	private	law	as	a	coherent	system	and	of	equal	treatment,	but	
these	are	not	urgent	problems	once	we	conceive	of	law	as	a	market.49	
	
Note	several	ways	in	which	Smits’	conception	of	legal	pluralism	is	opposed	to	that	of	
Pierre	Legrand.	Other	than	Legrand,	Smits	proposes	a	juridical	pluralism.	However,	
where	 Legrand,	 like	 juridical	 pluralists,	 speaks	 of	 several	 incompatible	 but	
internally	 largely	 homogenous	 legal	 traditions	 (as	 expressed	 in	 national	 legal	
systems),	 Smits,	 seemingly	 like	 sociological	pluralists,	 emphasizes	 the	hybridity	of	
the	emerging	 law.	Where	Legrand	essentially	claims	that	 individuals	belong	 firmly	
to	one	 tradition	only,	Smits	emphasizes	 their	plural	affiliations.	As	a	 consequence,	
where	choice	for	Legrand	means	the	ability	to	make	one’s	tradition	one’s	own;	for	
Smits	it	means	the	possibility	to	switch	between	different	traditions	and	their	laws.	
a) Legal Pluralism and Choice 
This	use	of	choice	is	an	ingenious	twist	on	traditional	ideas	of	communities.	In	much	
of	the	literature	on	legal	pluralism,	belonging	to	numerous	communities	is	a	matter	
not	 of	 choice	 but	 of	 necessity:	 a	 London‐born	 Muslim	 may	 feel	 both	 as	 an	
Englishman	and	as	a	Muslim,	but	neither	identity	is	a	matter	of	choice	for	him,	and	
the	ensuing	conflict	between	English	and	 Islamic	rules	may	 feel	more	 like	a	 tragic	
choice50	than	like	the	opportunity	that	Smits	paints.	Arguably,	then,	Smits’	pluralism	
is	not	in	accordance	with	traditional	legal	pluralism,	but	rather	its	opposite	–	Smits	
now	calls	his	a	‘radical	view	of	legal	pluralism’51.	The	trader	in	the	law	market	is	the	
opposite	 of	 the	 community‐bound	 individual	 that	 many	 legal	 pluralists	 have	 in	
mind:	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	 choose	 among	 different	 laws	 not	 because	 they	 feel	
bound	by	all	of	them	(as	legal	pluralists	would	argue)	but	because	they	feel	bound	
by	none	of	 them.	Law,	 for	them,	becomes	a	matter	not	of	culture	and	tradition	but	
instead	a	commodity52.		
	
Smits,	knowingly	or	not,	adopts,	in	his	concept	of	legal	pluralism,	a	powerful	critique	
of	legal	pluralism,	namely	that	it	does	not	allow	for	individual	agency.53	Some	legal	
pluralists	have	made	a	similar	step:	they	now	emphasize	the	empowering	potential	
of	 legal	 pluralism,	 which	 enables	 in	 particular	 members	 of	 minorities	 to	 alter,	
strategically,	between	the	invocation	of	different	rules	for	their	interest—state	rules,	
local	 rules,	 and	 global	 rules	 (especially	 human	 rights	 rules).54	His	 ideas	 are	 thus	
																																																								
49	Smits	invokes	O’Hara	&	Ribstein,	supra	note	26.	
50	On	the	inability	of	economic	analysis	to	account	for	tragic	choices,	see	M	
Nussbaum,	‘The	Costs	of	Tragedy:	Some	Moral	Limits	of	Cost‐Benefits	Analysis’	
(2000)	29	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	1005.	
51	In	this	volume.	
52	See	supra	note	27.	
53	Supra	note	23.	
54	SE	Merry,	Human	Rights	and	Gender	Violence:	Translating	International	Law	into	
Local	Justice	(University	of	Chicago	Press,	2006);	B	Rajagopal,	‘The	Role	of	Law	in	
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comparable	to	 those	of	 Joerges	mentioned	before:	 the	 individual	uses	pluralism	to	
escape	laws	and	require	them	to	justify	themselves.	
b) Mandatory and Facilitative Rules 
Somewhat	surprisingly,	however,	Smits	does	not	go	all	the	way,	and	his	‘radical	legal	
pluralism’	is,	in	the	end,	anything	but	radical.	Smits	limits	party	choice	to	facilitative	
rules.	 This	makes	 it	 necessary	 to	 distinguish	 facilitative	 from	mandatory	 rules,	 as	
Smits	points	out,	but	he	does	not	tell	us	how	the	distinction	should	be	made	or,	more	
importantly,	 who	 should	 make	 it.	 (He	 does	 not,	 unfortunately,	 make	 use	 of	 the	
ample	literature	in	choice	of	law	on	the	question.)55		
	
This	limitation	to	facilitative	rules	is	in	opposition	to	neoliberal	theories	of	conflict	
of	 laws.56	Here,	 proponents	 of	 a	 market	 for	 laws	 see	 its	 biggest	 attraction	 in	 the	
possibility	 for	 individuals	 to	 opt	 out	 of	 otherwise	 mandatory	 rules	 of	 one	 legal	
system	by	choosing	another.	Taking	away	that	choice	robs	the	approach	of	much	of	
its	neoliberal	appeal.	It	goes	behind	even	existing	law,	which	allows	parties	to	avoid	
most	mandatory	rules	of	the	normally	applicable	law	by	choosing	another	law,	and	
only	protects	so‐called	internationally	mandatory	rules	against	the	party	choice.57	
	
However,	 leaving	 mandatory	 rules	 untouched	 will	 also	 leave	 legal	 pluralists	
unsatisfied.	 Facilitative	 rules	 are	 already	widely	 subject	 to	 party	 autonomy	under	
existing	private	law;	insofar	Smits	only	states	the	status	quo.	By	contrast,	the	main	
focus	 of	 legal	 pluralists	 is	 precisely	 on	 situations	 in	 which	 actors	 face	 conflicting	
rules	 all	 of	which	 claim	 applicability,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 difficult	 case.	What	 about	 he	
Muslim	who	wants	to	comply	with	both	religious	and	state	law	requirements?	What	
to	make	of	mandatory	rules	and	the	conflicts	between	them?	Smits	rightly	argues,	in	
accordance	with	both	private	international	law	scholars58	and	legal	pluralists59,	that	
territoriality	no	longer	serves	as	a	good	criterion.	But	he	(like	them)	does	not	give	us	
																																																																																																																																																																					
Counter‐hegemonic	Globalization	and	Global	Legal	Pluralism:	Lessons	from	the	
Narmada	Valley	struggle	in	India’	(2005)	18	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	345.		
55	See	R	Michaels,	‘Die	Struktur	der	kollisionsrechtlichen	Durchsetzung	einfach	
zwingender	Normen’	in	R	Michaels	&	D	Solomon	(eds),	Liber	amicorum	Klaus	
Schurig	(Sellier	2012)	191.	
56	MJ	Whincop	and	ME	Keyes,	‘Statutes’	Domains	in	Private	International	Law:	An	
Economic	Theory	of	the	Limits	of	Mandatory	Rules’	(1998)	20	Sydney	Law	Review	
435;	EA	O’Hara,	‘Opting	Out	of	Regulation:	A	Public	Choice	Analysis	of	Contractual	
Choice	of	Law’	(2000)	53	Vanderbilt	Law	Review	1551.	
57	R	Michaels	(supra	note	55).	
58	EG	Lorenzen,	‘Territoriality,	Public	Policy	and	the	Conflict	of	Laws’	(1923)	Yale	
Law	Journal	736;	H	Muir	Watt,	On	the	Waning	Magic	of	Territoriality	in	the	Conflict	
of	Laws,	in	M	Andenas	and	D	Fairgrieve	(eds),	 Tom	Bingham	and	the	
Transformation	of	the	Law:	A	Liber	Amicorum	(Oxford	University	Press,	2009)	751.	
59	PS	Berman,	The	Globalization	of	Jurisdiction’	(2002)	151	University	of	
Pennsylvania	Law	Review	311.	
	 15
any	 clearer	 answers60	than	 his	 hope	 for	 a	 legal	 doctrine	 that	 will	 move	 towards	
arguments.61	
c) The Marketplace for Rules and Ideas 
	
The	hope	is	that	the	legal	system	will	evolve,	and	the	better	rules,	the	better	ideas	
will	 succeed.	 Here,	 Smits	 takes	 up	 his	 earlier	 ideas	 of	 a	 ‘free	 movement	 of	 legal	
rules,’62	an	 idea	 in	 turn	 inspired	 by	 (again	 neoliberal)	 concepts	 of	 regulatory	
competition,	and	combines	it	with	a	Habermasian	hope	in	the	‘unforced	force	of	the	
better	argument’.63	This	faces	two	important	kinds	of	criticism.	
	
First,	 this	 looks,	 in	 the	 end,	 more	 like	 a	 monist	 than	 a	 pluralist	 theory.	 In	 the	
competition	for	legal	rules,	the	best	one	ultimately	wins,	and	we	have	unity.64	In	the	
Habermasian	 discourse,	 the	 better	 argument	 wins	 in	 the	 end,	 what	 we	 have	 is	 a	
tendency	toward	consensus	and	thus	unity.65		
	
Second,	 the	 hope	 that	 legal	 evolution	will,	 somehow,	 lead	 to	 victory	 of	 the	 better	
argument	presumes	a	 rather	perfect	 (‘herrschaftsfrei’)	market	 for	 those	 ideas,	 and	
no	 interventions	 from	 special	 interests.	 It	 thus	 runs	 up	 against	 a	 criticism,	which,	
from	 the	 opposite	 side,	 has	 been	 made	 against	 theories	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 too:	
blindness	 to	 power	 relations.66	In	 legal	 pluralism,	 the	 almost	 romantic	 fascination	
with	 intersystemic	dialogue	and	mutual	deference	 sometimes	 tends	 to	be	blind	 to	
the	role	of	power	in	determining	winners	and	losers.	Fascination	over	the	fact	that	
state	 law	 can	 never	 fully	 overcome	 non‐state	 law	 but	 is	 instead	 influenced	 by	 it,	
makes	some	legal	pluralists	blind	to	two	possibilities:	First,	the	state	may	sometimes	
be	 ‘cunning;’	 it	 may	 pretend	 to	 be	 weak	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 responsibility	 for	
outcomes.67	Second,	 whether	 state	 law	 or	 non‐state	 law	wins,	 in	 a	 given	 conflict,	
																																																								
60	Cf	the	suggestions	in	R	Michaels,	Territorial	Jurisdiction	after	Territoriality,		in	PJ	
Slot	&	M	Bulterman	(eds),	Globalisation	and	Jurisdiction	(Kluwer	International	
2004)	105.	
61	For	Smits’	own	suggestions	on	the	role	of	legal	argument	more	general,	see	now	
his	impressive	book	The	Mind	and	Method	of	the	Legal	Academic	(Elgar	2012).	
62	J	Smits,	‘A	European	Private	Law	as	a	Mixed	Legal	System.	Towards	a	Ius	
Commune	through	the	Free	Movement	of	Legal	Rules’	(1998)	5	Maastricht	Journal	of	
European	and	Comparative	Law	328.	
63	E.g.	Jürgen	Habermas,	The	Philosophical	Discourse	of	Modernity:	Twelve	Lectures	
(MIT	Press	1987)	130.	
64	Cf.	J	Smits,	‘Mixed	Jurisdictions:	Lessons	for	European	Harmonisation?’	(2008)	
12.1	Electronic	Journal	of	Comparative	Law.	
65	C	Mouffe,	‘Deliberative	democracy	or	agonistic	pluralism?’	(1999)	66	Social	
Research	745.	
66	Supra	note	20.	
67	S	Randeria,	‘The	State	of	Globalization:	Legal	Plurality,	Overlapping	Sovereignties	
and	Ambiguous	Alliances	between	Civil	Society	and	the	Cunning	State	in	India’	
(2007)	24	Theory,	Culture	and	Society	1.	
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allows	 no	 a	 priori	 conclusion	 for	 whether	 the	 concrete	 result	 of	 that	 victory	 is	
desirable	or	not.	The	same	seems	true	for	a	marketplace	of	legal	ideas:	some	ideas	
win	because	they	were	favored	by	those	powerful	or	numerous	enough	to	make	that	
happen,	but	that	does	not	say	much	about	their	intrinsic	quality.	
	
In	the	end,	an	umpire	seems	to	be	needed.	Smits	indeed	finds	such	an	umpire	in	the	
nation	state	and	its	lawmaker,	who	can	(and,	as	he	says,	should)	make	clear	which	of	
its	rules	are	mandatory	(and	thus	exempt	 from	party	choice)	and	which	are	not.68	
This	 preference	 for	 statutory	 determination	 of	 mandatory	 rules	 is	 shared	 in	 the	
literature	on	private	 international	 law.69	But	 it	weakens	 considerably	 the	pluralist	
idea	of	moving	beyond	state	centralism.	
V. A postmodern pluralism – Wilhelmsson 
	
Yet	 a	 different	 concept	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 emerges	 from	 the	 work	 of	 Thomas	
Wilhelmsson. 70 	Wilhelmsson	 aligns	 himself	 with	 postmodernism, 71 	and	 it	 is	
therefore	 no	 surprise	 that	 he	 finds	 influence	 in	 the	 ideas	 about	 legal	 pluralism	
voiced	by	Boaventura	de	Sousa	Santos.72	Wilhelmsson’s	starting	point	is	one	that	is	
prominent	in	(though	not	exclusive	to)	postmodernism:	contemporary	societies	are	
intrinsically,	and	irreducibly	pluralistic.	This	 is	 the	case	on	the	European	level	and	
on	 the	national	 level.	As	a	consequence,	Wilhelmsson’s	 legal	pluralism	operates	at	
two	levels:	between,	and	within	national	legal	systems.	
As	 concerns	 pluralism	 between	 national	 legal	 systems,	 Wilhelmsson	 suggests	
(insofar	like	Legrand)	that	different	legal	systems	rest	on	very	different	cultures	and	
value	systems.	If	this	is	so,	then	a	static	European	unification	would	not	be	merely	
technical;	it	would	also	disrupt	grown	national	and	local	structures	and	cultures	of	
law.	Wilhelmsson	is	here	thinking	less	of	the	common	law	(which	is	Legrand’s	main	
focus)	and	more	of	Nordic	 law	with	 its	purported	greater	emphasis	on	informality	
and	on	social	values.73	In	particular,	he	points	out,	the	German	Civil	Code	(BGB)	does	
																																																								
68	Smits	(supra	note	76)	335..	
69	O’Hara	&	Ribstein,	supra	note	26.	
70	In	what	follows,	I	can	unfortunately	only	draw	on	publications	in	English.		
71	E.g.	T	Wilhelmsson,	‘Towards	a	(Post)modern	European	Contract	Law’	(2001)	6	
Juridica	International	23.	But	cf.	T	Wilhelmsson,	‘The	ethical	pluralism	of	late	
modern	Europe	and	codification	of	European	contract	law’	in	J	Smits	(ed)	The	Need	
for	a	European	Contract	Law—Empirical	and	Legal	Perspectives		(Europa	Law	
Publishing	2005),	125	(preferring	late‐modern	over	postmodern).	
72	E.g.	T	Wilhelmsson,	Critical	Studies	in	Private	Law	‐	A	Treatise	on	Need‐Rational	
Principles	in	Modern	Law	(Springer,	1992),	224‐226.	Santos	prefers	to	speak	of	legal	
plurality,	largely	because	he	opposes	elements	in	the	legal	pluralism	debate.	Cf	B	de	
Sousa	Santos,	Toward	a	New	Legal	Common	Sense	(Butterworths,	2d	ed.	2004),	89‐
98.	
73	T	Wilhelmsson,	supra	note	72,	at	16‐20	et	passim;	T	Wilhelmsson,	Social	Contract	
Law	and	European	Integration	(Dartmouth	Publishing	Company	1995),	7‐11,191‐
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not	 provide	 a	 helpful	 model	 for	 a	 European	 codification,	 because	 ‘[t]he	 BGB	was	
made	 for	 a	 bourgeois	 society	 and	 for	 a[n]	 original	 market	 capitalism	 and	 in	 that	
sense	could	 reflect	a	 fairly	homogeneous	 	world	outlook.’74	Our	world	 is	different;	
we	 face	a	 ‘dissolution	of	 traditional	 structures	of	understanding’	 and	 therefore	 an	
ethical	 fragmentation	 that	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 captured	 by	 a	 coherent	 code.75	
Wilhelmsson’s	 plea	 for	 a	 ‘fragmentized	 Europeanization’76	realises	 that	 even	 if	
Europe	 retains	 a	 plurality	 of	 national	 legal	 systems,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 focus	
somehow	on	the	interrelation	between	these.	
However,	 unlike	 Legrand,	 Wilhelmsson	 does	 not	 treat	 national	 legal	 systems	 as	
relatively	 coherent	 and	 autonomous.	 Instead,	 he	 emphasizes	 also	 the	 internally	
pluralistic	character	of	national	 legal	systems.	The	same	dissolution	also	 functions	
on	 the	 level	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 state	 becomes	 fragmented	 internally	 –	 different	
authorities	attain	semi‐autonomy	and	will	 thus	not	always	apply	the	same	law	the	
same	 way.	 But	 the	 state	 also	 becomes	 fragmented	 externally:	 ‘the	 borderline	
between	 state	 and	 society	 becomes	 less	 and	 less	 clear’ 77 	(an	 aspect	 that	
Wilhelmsson	does	not,	as	far	as	I	can	see,	discuss		at	great	length	elswhere.	
And,	 furthermore,	 Wilhelmsson	 even	 welcomes	 –	 to	 some	 extent	 –	 the	 mutual	
irritation	between	different	laws.	He	shares	Smits’	preference	for	a	free	transfer	of	
legal	rules	and	ideas,78	though	with	less	sympathy	for	an	actual	market	that	would	
generate	such	a	transfer.		What	he	calls	a	‘Jack‐in‐the‐box’	theory	of	European	law	is	
the	 idea	 that	 European	 law	 suddenly	 pops	 up	 within	 domestic	 legal	 systems	 in	
unexpected	situations.79	This	creates	disruptions	 in	 the	national	 legal	 systems,	but	
such	disruptions	can	in	fact	be	useful	to	break	up	old	structures	and	traditions.	
																																																																																																																																																																					
208.	An	interesting	‘outsider’s’	analysis	is	J	Smits,	‘Nordic	Law	in	a	European	
Context:	Some	Comparative	Observations’	in	J	Husa	et	al	(eds.),	Nordic	Law	‐	
Between	Tradition	and	Dynamism	(Intersentia	2007)	55.	
74	T	Wilhelmsson,	‘Ethical	pluralism’	(supra	note	71)	121.	
75	See	ibid	136;	‘Contextual	morality	is	difficult	to	connect	with	a	general	civil	code	
with	a	strong	systematic	structure;’	cf.	T	Wilhelmsson,	Welfare	State	Expectations,	
Privatisation	and	Private	Law,	in	T	Wilhelmsson	and	S	Hurri	(eds)	From	Dissonance	
to	Sense:	Welfare	State	Expectations,	Privatisation	and	Private	Law	(Ashgate,	1999)	3,	
18‐22.	Andrei	Marmor	has	made	a	somewhat	related	argument	from	a	Rawlsian	
liberal	perspective:	our	pluralism	of	ultimate	conceptions	of	the	good	suggests	that	
legislative	coherence	is	not	of	high	value:	Andrei	Marmor,	Should	we	Value	
Legislative	Integrity?,	in	Andrei	Marmor,	Law	in	the	Age	of	Pluralism	(Oxforud	
University	Press,	2007)	39.	
76	T	Wilhelmsson,	‘Private	Law	in	the	EU:	Harmonised	or	Fragmented	
Europeanization?’	(2002)	1	European	Review	on	Private	Law	77,	89	ff.	
77	T	Wilhelmsson	(supra	note	72)	224.	
78	T	Wilhelmsson,	supra	note	74,	at	124.	
79	T	Wilhelmsson,	‘Jack‐in‐the‐box	theory	of	European	Community	law’,	in:	L	Krämer	
et	al	(eds),	Law	and	Diffuse	Interests	in	the	European	Legal	Order:	Liber	Amicorum	
Norbert	Reich	(Nomos,	1997),	177;	T	Wilhelmsson,	‘Private	Law	in	the	EU:	
Harmonised	or	Fragmented	Europeanization?’	(2002)	1	European	Review	on	Private	
Law,	79‐82.	
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In	many	ways,	Wilhelmsson’s	concept	of	legal	pluralism	is	the	one	closest	to	strong	
or	sociological	legal	pluralism	as	discussed	above	–	and	thus,	many	problems	of	his	
approach	are	problems	of	the	whole	idea	of	legal	pluralism.	In	what	follows,	I	want	
to	 focus	on	 three	problems	with	 the	conception	 that	stem	not	 from	this	proximity	
but	from	what	I	perceive	as	problems	with	Wilhelmsson’s	concept.	
	
a) External Pluralism and Internal Coherence 
A	 first	 problem	 is	 one	 that	we	 already	 saw	 in	 Legrand’s	 concept:	 the	 problem	 of	
internal	 homogeneity	 and	 essentialism.	 If	 pluralism	 is	 about	 plurality	 of	 legal	
systems,	 then	 it	 implies	 that	 differences	 between	 such	 systems	 are	 greater	 than	
differences	within	such	systems	–	and	thus,	 that	systems	themselves	are	relatively	
coherent	 internally.	This	 is	unproblematic	 for	a	communitarian	concept;	 indeed,	 it	
might	 be	 considered	 a	 founding	 element	 of	 communitarianism.	 It	 is,	 however,	
diametrically	opposed	to	the	postmodern	idea	that	Wilhelmsson	espouses,	namely,	
that	legal	systems	are	internally	fragmented,	too.80		
And	yet,	when	Wilhelmsson	espouses	a	specific	Nordic	approach	to	law,	he	arguably	
falls	 into	 this	 trap	 of	 homogeneity.81	The	 idea	 that	 Nordic	 law	 has	 certain	
characteristics	 has	 become	 hugely	 popular	 in	 Nordic	 countries.82	But	 it	 presumes	
that	there	is	something	typically	and	(relatively)	homogenously	Nordic	about	law	in	
Nordic	countries.	Moreover,	if	indeed	law	and	society	are	as	closely	interconnected	
as	Wilhelmsson	suggests,	then	this	presumes	also	that	there	is	something	typically	
and	(relatively)	homogenous	about	Nordic	society.	And	this	seems	unavoidable.	The	
stronger	our	claim	that	differences	exist	between	the	national	systems	of	the	EU,	the	
more	 necessary	 it	 becomes	 that	 these	 legal	 systems	 are	 internally	 relatively	
coherent.	The	stronger	external	plurality	thus	implicates	an	internal	homogeneity.83	
	
Both	 these	 claims	 are	 problematic	 not	 only	 methodologically,	 but	 also	 factually.	
Rasmus	Goksor	shows	in	his	forthcoming	Duke	dissertation	how	much	the	idea	of	a	
Nordic,	or	Scandinavian,	identity	is	more	a	product	of	the	19th	and	20th	century	than	
an	essential	trait	of	Scandinavia	per	se.	And	he	demonstrates	in	that	dissertation	(as	
he	has	in	an	earlier	publication)84	that	the	idea	of	a	specifically	‘social’	character	of	
Nordic	 law,	 as	 compared	 to	 a	hard	 liberal	European	 law,	 is	more	 complex	 than	 is	
usually	acknowledged.	Scandinavian	law,	like	the	law	of	any	other	country	or	region,	
																																																								
80	Supra	note	21.	
81	E.g.	T	Wilhelmsson,	Social	Contract	Law	and	European	Integration	(Dartmouth	
1995)	7.	
82	See,	most	recently,	Pia	Pia	Letto‐Vanamo,	Law	and	(Social)	Justice	–	Nordic	
Perspectives	(2011),	http://ssrn.com/abstract=1823386.	
83	This	is	so	for	most	legal	pluralists,	though	some,	and	especially	postmodern	
pluralists,	recognize	the	problem	and	suggest	alternatives,	like	for	example	
fractalized	rather	than	plural	law.	
84	R	Goksor,	‘Jurisprudence	on	Protection	of	Weaker	Parties	in	European	Contract	
Law	From	a	Swedish	and	Nordic	Perspective’	(2006)	6	Chicago‐Kent	Journal	of	
International	&	Comparative	Law	184.	
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emerges	 from	 numerous	 internal	 struggles	 that	 remain	 infinitely	 unresolved,	 and	
‘social’	 ideas	 struggle	 with	 more	 market	 liberal	 ones.	 Scholars	 often	 take	
Wilhelmsson,	one	of	the	first	to	write	at	length	in	English	about	Scandinavian	law,	as	
a	 spokesperson	 for	 all	 of	 Scandinavia,	 because	 they	 cannot	 follow	 the	 internal	
Scandinavian	 debates.	 But	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 relatively	 coherent	 Scandinavian	
identity	 in	 law	 and	 society	 is	 used	 as	 a	 strategic	 argument	 to	 fight	 off	 certain	
influences	from	Europe	(or	to	propose	alternatives	for	European	law).	Wilhelmsson	
realizes	the	strategic	use	of	such	proclamations	of	homogeneity	when,	in	talking	of	
Germany,	 he	 refers	 to	 ‘the	 homogeneity	 of	 (the	 dominating	 perceptions)	 of	
society.’85	Claims	for	the	homogeneity	of	Nordic	society	may	be	similar:	dominating	
perceptions	invoked	for	strategic	reasons,	not	actual	empirical	truths.	
	
b) Pluralism and systems of law 
This	 last	 insight	 suggests	 a	 problem	with	 another	 of	Wilhelmsson’s	 claims	 about	
legal	 pluralism.	 I	 refer	 to	 his	 claim	 that	 pluralistic	 societies	 make	 pluralistic	 law	
necessary	 and	 unavoidable	 –	 or,	 the	 flipside,	 that	 systematic	 and	 monist	 law	 is	
possible	 only	 for	 homogenous	 societies.	 This	 is	 a	 frequently	 made	 argument	 in	
private	 law	 debates,	 but	 I	 think	 it	 either	 rests	 on	 an	 error	 or	 is	 at	 least	 too	
simplistic.86		
Consider	 Wilhelmsson’s	 claim	 that	 the	 systematic	 BGB	 was	 possible	 in	 the	 19th	
century	only	because	society	was	largely	homogeneous,	both	in	its	values	and	in	its	
setup.	This	historical	assumption	is	hardly	tenable:	German	19th	society	was	deeply	
fragmented.87	Political	 views	 ranged	 from	 far	 more	 extreme	 edges	 than	 they	 do	
today.	Society	was	relatively	stratified,	and	if	the	19th	century	was	the	century	of	the	
bourgeoise,	 then	 the	pleas	of	 the	working	 class	were	already	growing	 louder,	 and	
their	 exclusion	 from	 the	 new	 BGB	 was	 already	 a	 ground	 for	 its	 criticism.88	If	
Wilhelmsson	 invokes	 Wieacker	 for	 his	 claim	 of	 societal	 homogeneity,89	he	 must	
misunderstand	Wieacker,	who	points	out	explicily,	though	elsewhere,	‘that	the	BGB	
tried	to	reconcile	several	different	value‐systems	which	nineteenth	century	German	
society	had	allowed	to	coexist	witout	coalescing;	it	is	not	the	mouthpiece	of	a	united	
social	and	political	movement.’90	
																																																								
85		T	Wilhelmsson,	‘Ethical	pluralism’	(supra	note	71)	121..	
86	I	am	hoping	to	work	these	points	out	in	more	detail	in	a	separate	paper.	
87	The	classical	work	is	HU	Wehler.	Deutsche	Gesellschaftsgeschichte,	Vol	3	‐	Von	der	
'Deutschen	Doppelrevolution'	bis	zum	Beginn	des	Ersten	Weltkrieges	1849‐1914	
(2d	ed.	2007);	cf.	also	T	Nipperdey,	Deutsche	Geschichte	1800‐1918	(3	Vols.,	pb.	ed.	
1998).	
88	T	Repgen,	Die	soziale	Aufgabe	des	Privatrechts.	Eine	Grundfrage	in	Wissenschaft	
und	Kodifikation	am	Ende	des	19.	Jahrhunderts	(2001).	
89	F	Wieacker,	Industriegesellschaft	und	Privatrechtsordnung	(1974).	Wieacker’s	
views	on	the	relatively	liberal	character	of	the	BGB	have	been	criticized	by	J	Rückert,	
‘Das	Bürgerliche	Gesetzbuch	‐	ein	Gesetzbuch	ohne	Chance?’	in	Juristenzeitung	
(2003),	749.	
90	F	Wieacker,	A	History	of	Private	Law	in	Europe	(Clarendon	Press	1995)	380		
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In	fact,	the	German	history	suggests	the	exact	opposite	of	Wilhelmsson’s	claim	might	
be	true:	a	systematic	and	technical	private	law	may	be	especially	appropriate	for	a	
pluralistic	 society.91	The	 reason	 is	 that	 technical	 law	 can	 translate	 otherwise	
unsolvable	 substantive	 disputes	 into	 solvable	 technical	 ones 92 	Substantive	
incommensurability	 of	 plural	 values	 is	 thus	 overcome	 in	 a	 legal	 system	 that	
guarantees	internal	coherence	as	an	alternative.	
This	may	or	may	not	be	true.	It	is	certainly	the	case,	that	the	more	regulatory	law	of	
the	20th	century	has	created	a	law	that	is	more	fragmented,	and	this	may	be	a	sign	of	
pluralism.	 The	 point	 here	 is	 that	 political	 and	 societal	 pluralism	 is	 different	 from	
legal	pluralism,	and	one	does	not	immediately	translate	into	the	other.	
c) Irritants 
A	 third	 point,	 however,	may	 be	 the	most	 important	 one.	 Recall	 how	 Legrand	 and	
Smits	 dealt	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 legal	 systems	 influencing	 each	 other.	 Legrand	
opposed	such	influence;	Smits	celebrated	it	as	a	welcome	consequence	of	regulatory	
competition	 and	 free	 party	 choice	 of	 law.	Wilhelmsson	 does	 not	 want	 to	 protect	
national	 law	 from	 Europe	 (as	 Legrand	 does),	 but	 neither	 is	 he	 willing	 to	 leave	
interactions	between	legal	systems	to	a	market	(as	Smits	does).	Instead,	he	suggests	
a	careful	calibration:	
	
‘Solutions	cannot	be	picked	out	here	and	there,	without	strict	analysis	of	their	social	
and	cultural	background.	In	a	transnationally‐oriented	legal	research	which	makes	
use	of	the	fragmentation	of	law	it	s	not	a	question	of	an	arbitrary	flow	of	transplants	
from	 one	 place	 to	 another,	 but	 of	 finding	 suitable	 legal	 irritants	 to	 develop	 one’s	
own	legal	surroundings’.93	
	
This	 reference	 to	 Teubner’s	 concept	 of	 legal	 irritants	 is	 interesting.94	Unlike	
Wilhelmsson,	 Teubner	 focuses	 less	 on	 the	 active	 choice	 by	 the	 law	 reformer	 and	
more	on	the	internal	reactions	of	legal	systems	to	irritations.	And	indeed,	from	his	
systems	theoretical	perspective,	the	idea	of	actively	picking	proper	irritants	seems	
somewhat	paradoxical:	If	a	legal	system	picks	what	it	wants	to	be	irritated	by,	then,	
because	it	can	already	predicts	what	will	happen,	that	is	by	definition	no	longer	an	
irritation	–	in	the	same	way	in	which	we	cannot	tickle	ourselves.95	
It	may	be	 that	what	Wilhelmsson	has	 in	mind	 is	 less	 the	 reformer	 in	 the	national	
system	deciding	on	what	to	be	irritated	by,	and	more	the	superior	governor	–	say,	
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the	European	Commission	–	deciding	how	to	irritate	individual	legal	systems.	In	this	
context,	 of	 course,	 strict	 analysis	 of	 social	 and	 cultural	 background	 are	 necessary	
(though	frequently	ignored).96	But	if	this	is	a	pluralist	perspective,	it	is	at	best	one	of	
weak	 legal	 pluralism:	 a	 pluralism	 that	 exists	 due	 to	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	whole,	
which	in	this	case	is	not	the	state	but	something	functionally	similar,	the	European	
Union.	Ultimately,	it	appears,	Wilhelmsson	also	shies	away	from	taking	the	last	step	
towards	 adopting	 a	 true	 pluralism	 with	 no	 hierarchically	 superior	 institution	 to	
order	and	structure	it.	
VI.Concluding Remarks 
It	turns	out	that	none	of	the	three	theories	discussed	here	is	an	actual	theory	of	legal	
pluralism.	 Legrand’s	 pluralism	 is	 a	 communitarianism	 without	 significant	
interactions	between	the	separate	legal	orders	he	has	in	mind.	Smits	proposes	a	real	
plurality	of	interacting	legal	orders,	but	then	leaves	untouched	what	is	perhaps	the	
central	 issue	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 namely	 mandatory	 rules,.	 Wilhelmsson,	 finally,	
comes	 closest	 to	 an	 actual	 concept	 of	 pluralism,	 but	 oscillates	 between	 ideas	 of	
fragmentation	and	homogeneity,	and	flirts	with	regulatory	ordering	of	the	pluralism.	
An	actual	theory	of	European	private	law	pluralism	is	still	lacking.	
And	 it	may	 not	 be	 forthcoming.	 After	 all,	 all	 three	 concepts	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 are	
sharply	 different,	 but	 all	 have	 several	 traits	 in	 common,	 too,	 that	 may	 be	
characteristic	of	the	European	debate.	
A	first	commonality	is	that,	when	using	the	idea	of	legal	pluralism,	all	three	authors	
focus	 almost	 exclusively	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 plurality	 of	 (formal)	 legal	 systems	 –	 in	
particular,	national	legal	systems	–,	and	ignore	the	second	important	aspect	of	legal	
pluralism,	 namely	 the	 idea	 of	 privately	 created	 law.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 ideas	
about	 society	 are	 absent	 from	 the	 proposals:	 Legrand	 conceptualizes	 laws	 as	
mirrors	of	society;	Smits	suggests	that	choice	of	 law	is	a	way	to	opt	out	of	culture;	
Wilhelmsson	 suggests	 that	 the	 plurality	 of	 society	 makes	 plural	 legal	 systems	
necessary.	But	 in	 all	 these	 concepts,	 society	 is	 a	 cause	 for	 the	development	of	 the	
legal	system,	not	a	creator	of	law	on	its	own.	In	the	end,	what	all	of	them	focus	on	as	
their	 starting	 point,	 is	 formalized	 law.	 This	 is	 representative	 of	 most	 debates	 on	
European	private	law	more	generally.	
A	 second	commonality	 is	 that	none	of	 the	 three	authors	here	 settles	 for	a	 ‘strong’	
legal	 pluralism.	 Wilhelmsson	 and	 Smits	 both	 assume	 a	 superior	 lawmaker:	
Wilhelmsson’s	 lawmaker	 decides	 which	 irritants	 will	 work	 best;	 Smits’	 superior	
lawmaker	sets	up	a	system	of	choice	of	law	rules	that	protect	mandatory	rules	from	
free	choice.	Legrand	alone	seems	to	oppose	such	a	superior	lawmaker,	but	he	does	
appeal	 to	 a	 general	 ethical	 position	 against	 mutual	 domination	 and	 influence	
between	 legal	 systems.	 Here,	 we	 see	 the	 European	 preference	 for	 ‘ordered	
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pluralism’97	Whether		viewed	as	a	problem	or	an	opportunity,	ultmately,	pluralis	is	
something	that	needs	to	be	regulated.	
These	are	shortcomings	vis‐à‐vis	 legal	pluralism,	but	not	necessarily	shortcomings	
for	European	private	law.	The	relative	neglect	of	non‐state	law	is	not	necessarily	a	
bad	 thing,	 at	 least	 analytically,	 perhaps	 even	 normatively.98	The	 legal	 pluralism	
debate	has	always	struggled	with	the	distinction	of	law	and	non‐law.	That	may	not	
be	 a	 problem	 for	 sociological	 and	 anthropological	 accounts,	 but	 it	 does	 become	 a	
problem	for	debates	about	law	reform.	
I	have	more	doubts	about	the	perceived	need	for	an	ordered,	weak,	as	opposed	to	a	
strong	 legal	 pluralism.	 But	 in	 discussions	 about	 law	 reform,	 a	 purely	 sociological	
perspective	as	 is	 inherent	 in	traditional	concepts	of	strong	 legal	pluralism,	may	be	
inadequate.	 It	may	 leave	 reform	 to	 technocractic	 law	 reformers	who	may	want	 to	
implement	German‐style	Codes	without	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 issues	 the	 three	authors	
here	 raise.	 To	 engage	 in	 law	 reform	 debates	 (as	 do	 all	 three	 authors),	 one	 must	
enagage	in	legal	discourse.	A	sociological	legal	pluralism	may	be	informative	for	this,	
but	not	necessarily	conducive	to	proper	legal	solutions.	
Although	these	theories	are	not	truly	pluralist,	we	learn	something	about	European	
private	law	from	each	of	them.	But	do	we	also	learn	something	about	legal	pluralism,	
and	 its	 adequacy	 for	 European	 private	 law?	 The	 fact	 that	 all	 existing	 pluralist	
theories	of	European	private	law	fail,	at	 least	as	theories,	does	not	mean	that	 legal	
pluralism	is	an	 intrinsically	 inappropriate	concept	 for	European	private	 law,	but	 it	
certainly	 leaves	 some	 doubts.	 Ultimately,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 legal	 pluralism	 is	 less	
adequate	 than	 other	 approaches:	 The	 idea	 of	 relatively	 autonomous	 legal	 orders	
does	not	square	well	with	the	interpenetration	of	European	and	national	law	in	the	
European	Union.	The	concept	of	interlegality,	although	occasionally	invoked	also	for	
the	 relation	 between	 European	 and	 national	 law,99	may	 be	 inferior	 to	 recent	
attempts	 to	 reinvigorate	 conflict	 of	 laws.100	This	 suggests	 that,	 ultimately,	 legal	
pluralism	may	 just	have	been	another	terminology	with	which	the	ongoing	debate	
on	European	private	law	has	been	led.	That	may	not	be	so	bad. 
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